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Abstract. A significant thread in Boris Hessen‟s iconic essay, The 
Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia (1931), is his critique of Newton‟s 
involving God in his physics. Contra Newton, Hessen believes that nature 
does not need God in order to function properly. Hessen gives two, quite 
distinct, „internal‟ explanations of Newton‟s failure to see this. The first 
explanation is that Newton‟s failure is caused by his believing that motion is a 
mode instead of an attribute or essence of matter. The second explanation is 
that Newton‟s failure is owed to his considering mechanical motion as the 
sole form of the motion of matter: Newton, in Hessen‟s view, did not realize 
that matter has many forms of motion which constantly transform into one 
another while conserving energy. In the present paper, I defend the thesis 
that none of these explanations can account for Newton‟s failure. Hessen‟s 
first explanation is problematic because even if Newton believed that motion 
is an attribute or essence of matter, he would still be obliged to involve God 
in physics. His second explanation fails too because he does not show exactly 
how the multiplicity and inter-transformation of forms of motion can account 
for nature‟s organizational structure. 
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[T]o treat God from phenomena is certainly a part of natural philosophy. 
Isaac Newton 
 
 
Introduction  
At the outset of the last part of The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s 
Principia1 (1931; hereafter TSERNP) the Soviet physicist, historian and philosopher of 
science Boris Hessen, while acknowledging Newton‟s enormous contribution to 
solving “the complex of physical and technical problems” of his era,2 insinuates that 
Newtonian physics was limited and even wrong insofar as it did not accommodate 
“the view that nature is in a process of unceasing development”3. He advises that 
“[Newton] came to a halt, helpless, before nature as a whole”4 and earlier spoke of a 
“weakness” in “Newton‟s general philosophical conception of the universe”5. 
Precisely because Newton did not realize that nature undergoes a process of unceasing 
development, he held two – in Hessen‟s view – mistaken beliefs about nature in 
general and the solar system in particular. First, Newton maintains that nature could 
not originate through natural causes alone. Second, he claims that it could not preserve its 
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state through natural causes alone. These two beliefs enabled Newton to hold that 
nature or the solar system was created by God and that its state is preserved by God. 
This view of nature, Hessen continues, became obsolete with Kant and 
Laplace, who ratified the notion of nature as undergoing a process of unceasing 
development: 
 
After Newton, Kant and Laplace were the first to make a breach in the 
view of nature as eternal and unchanging throughout the ages. They 
showed, albeit in a far from complete form, that the solar system is the 
product of historical development. It was through their works that the 
notion of development, which was subsequently to become the basic 
and guiding principle of all teaching on nature, entered into natural 
science for the first time. The solar system was not created by God, the 
movement of the planets is not the result of divine impulse. It not only 
preserves its state solely as a consequence of natural causes, but also 
came into existence through their influence alone. Not only does God 
have no place in a system whose existence is based on the laws of 
mechanics, but he is unnecessary even as an explanation of its origin.6  
         
In the present paper I focus on the following question: Why, according to Hessen, 
did Newton fail to see that nature is in a process of unceasing development? I understand this 
question as equivalent, mutatis mutandis, to the question: Why, according to Hessen, did 
Newton fail to see that nature does not need God in order to function properly? I consider these 
questions equivalent because I take it that for Hessen P1 and P2 are in a biconditional 
relation:7  
 
(P1) Nature is in a process of unceasing development. 
(P2) Nature does not need God in order to function properly. 
 
Hessen gives two, quite distinct, „internal‟ explanations of Newton‟s failure to 
see that nature does not need God in order to function properly. His first explanation 
is that Newton failed to see this because he took mechanical motion to be a mode 
instead of an attribute or essence of matter. His second explanation is that Newton‟s 
failure is owed to his considering mechanical motion to be the sole form of motion. In 
the present paper I will defend the thesis that none of Hessen’s explanations can account for Newton’s 
failure. I begin by making a case for Hessen‟s use of an internal explanation in 
TSERNP. Next, I describe his first explanation of Newton‟s failure, that is, Newton‟s 
belief (a) that mechanical motion is only a mode, not an attribute, of matter and (b) 
that, as a mode, mechanical motion cannot account for the movement in nature 
without the involvement of God. I proceed to argue that Hessen‟s first explanation of 
Newton‟s failure is unsuccessful because even if we assume that mechanical motion is 
an attribute of matter, Newtonian physics would still require God‟s presence in order 
to explain the organizational structure of nature. I then consider Hessen‟s objection 
that Cartesian physics, which is also purely mechanics, works unproblematically 
without involving God in its operations, even though it too takes motion to be a 
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mode of matter. If this were true, it would show that God‟s involvement is not a 
necessary consequence of mechanical physics. I argue that Cartesian physics does in 
fact need to involve God in its operations and therefore that Hessen‟s objection is 
false. Finally, I take issue with Hessen‟s second explanation of Newton‟s failure, to 
wit, that Newton‟s belief in mechanical motion‟s being the sole form of motion forced 
him to involve God in his physics. I argue that this second explanation is also 
unsuccessful because Hessen does not explain how the belief in a multiplicity of forms 
of motion can account for the organizational structure of nature without involving 
God in such an account.            
 
Internal and External Explanation 
Hessen is known as one of the pioneers of the „externalist‟ approach in the 
historiography and philosophy of science. According to this approach the trajectory of 
science is interwoven with the trajectory of human society as a whole and the 
explanation of the former‟s content requires reference to events that took place in the 
latter. In TSERNP Hessen attempts to establish the thesis that there are external 
explanatory interconnections between three distinct histories: (a) the history of 
physics, especially the history of the conceptions of matter‟s motion, (b) the history of 
technology, and (c) the history of economic production. He is particularly interested in 
providing external explanations of the history of the conceptions of matter‟s motion, 
to wit, in explaining events in this history by referencing events in the other two.  
In an accomplished study of Hessen‟s work,8 Dialetis argues convincingly that 
Hessen‟s external explanation of physics involves reference not only to the three 
aforementioned histories but also to the ideology of physicists (in TSERNP‟s case, to 
Newton‟s ideology). A physicist‟s ideology includes her religious, legal and political 
views and, Hessen judges, is the product of her social class.  
What has eluded Dialetis and, in fact, most readers of TSERNP, is that Hessen 
himself recognizes the involvement of „internal‟ explanations in any complete account 
of a theory of physics. Internal explanations attempt to explain an event in a particular 
history without exceeding its limits. So, an event in the history of the conceptions of 
matter‟s motion is explained „internally‟ if the explanantia belong neither to the history 
of technology nor to the history of economic production nor to the physicist‟s 
ideology but solely to the history of physics.   
Conceptions of motion in physics are, to a degree, internal explanations (they 
are arguments that develop, to a degree, purely within physics) and these explanations 
are exactly what constitutes the history of physics (as a history distinct from the history 
of technology, the history of economic production, and ideology). If Hessen wishes to 
provide external explanations of those conceptions of motion‟s history, he must first 
be aware of their internal explanations, namely of this history itself. Moreover, if he 
wishes to provide external explanations of the history of physics, he must first be aware 
of the distinct history of technology, the distinct history of economic production, and 
the distinct history of a physicist (i.e. her biography). The following diagram illustrates 
this view: 
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Ideology 
 
DIAGRAM 1: The structure of explanation 
 
Hessen, I contend, subscribes to this view. First, he devotes large chunks of 
TSERNP to giving exclusively internal accounts of the three aforementioned histories 
and Newton‟s ideology. Second, he explicitly recognizes that there was a moment in 
history when physics conceived of itself independently of the resolution of 
“empirically particular problems” and attempted “to establish a synthetic summary 
and solid theoretical basis for solving, by general methods, all the [problems of 
physics] […].”9 This purely “theoretical” attempt led to an “encyclopedic survey of the 
physical problems” which, in Newton‟s era, “amounted to creating a consistent 
structure of theoretical mechanics which would supply general methods for solving 
the problems of celestial and terrestrial mechanics.”10 In fact, Newton‟s Principia was 
presented and conceived of as just such a purely theoretical “encyclopedic survey” or 
a “synthesis” of entirely theoretical problems and solutions.11 
There is no denial that physics can be explained externally (in fact, Hessen 
does this masterfully), yet methodologically this is only possible if physics, technology, 
economic production and ideology already have their „own‟ histories – however limited 
they may explanatorily be. The vertical arrow(s) in the above diagram would have no 
object of application if the horizontal arrows were absent.  
Merton implies that Hessen failed to understand the independent “logical 
concatenation of scientific problems,” present in “the intrinsic developments of 
science,” which plays a crucial role in the explanation of the content of science, even 
though “in point of fact […] some role must be accorded [to] factors external to 
science.”12 Dialetis blames Merton for failing to comprehend that for Hessen there 
can be no “logical concatenation of scientific problems” that is not already determined 
by technology, economic production and ideology.13 In my view, there is a sense in 
which both Merton and Dialetis are amiss: Hessen does think that there is a “logical 
concatenation of scientific problems” which is, to a degree, independent of technology, 
economic production and ideology.14 This independence is determined methodologically: 
in order to even begin narrating a story about the external dependence of science upon 
technology, economic production and technology, the purely internal story of science 
(as well as those of technology, economic production and ideology) must already be 
known (with all their explanatory flaws).  
The present paper explores TSERNP with the aim of discussing Hessen‟s 
account of the internal (and therefore, according to him, limited) explanation of the 
fact that Newton failed to see that nature is in a process of unceasing development or, 
what is the same, that nature does not need God in order to function properly.  
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First Response: Motion as a Mode of Matter 
Hessen‟s first response to the question presented in the Introduction is that 
Newton failed to see that nature does not need God in order to function properly 
precisely because his view of matter‟s motion could not allow it. Newton had a solely 
or predominantly mechanical view of matter‟s motion15 and therefore his physics was 
solely or predominantly mechanical. Two basic features define the mechanical view 
(M). (M1) It presents motion in terms of causation: when a body moves, this is an 
effect of a cause.16 (M2) It sees motion solely as displacement: a body moves only if it 
changes place. Since Newton held these two beliefs, he had a mechanical view of 
motion. 
The mechanical view is also often characterized by the following feature. (M3) 
It understands motion in terms of bodily contact: the cause of a body‟s motion is 
always another body.17 Since matter is exhausted by bodies, all elements involved in 
this understanding would be material. The presence of this feature in the mechanical 
view turns it into a materialist mechanical view.  
Newtonian mechanics, however, is not materialist, as it denies M3. For 
Newton, matter‟s motion involves forces as causes, though forces are not bodies. Since 
he endorses the mechanical view but rejects M3, M3 does not belong to the definition 
of mechanics. Rather, M3 belongs to the definition of materialist mechanics. Given that 
Newtonian mechanics accommodates forces as causes of motion, it is a form of 
immaterialist mechanics. It is „immaterialist‟ only in the sense that it holds that besides other 
bodies, a given body‟s motion involves elements which are not part of matter, to wit, 
forces.  
There is yet another division of mechanics, which is grounded in the question 
of whether motion is to be considered (a) an attribute or essence of matter or (b) 
simply a mode of matter.18 Based on which of these two is accepted, mechanics is 
either essentialist or modal. For essentialist mechanics motion is a necessary feature of 
matter: matter is always in motion. By contrast, for modal mechanics motion is not a 
necessary feature of matter: it is possible that at some moment it is at rest. Rest is 
another mode of matter. Toland was a supporter of essentialist mechanics. Bacon, 
Descartes and Newton were all supporters of modal mechanics. 
Newtonian mechanics‟ can therefore properly be characterized as modal 
immaterialist mechanics (hereafter „MIM‟). It accepts the following four claims: 
 
(MIM 1) When a body moves, this is an effect of a cause. (Causation) 
(MIM 2) A body moves only if it changes place. (Displacement) 
(MIM 3) The cause of a body‟s motion involves not only another body but also 
forces, which are not material elements. (Immaterialism) 
(MIM 4) Motion is only a mode and not an attribute or essence of matter. (Modality) 
 
When Hessen writes that “the conception of divinity in Newton‟s system is by 
no means accidental but is organically connected with his views on matter and 
motion”19, he speaks as if the phrase “his views on matter and motion” stands 
specifically for MIM 4, as he explicitly writes that 
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by depriving motion of the character of being an attribute of matter, 
and recognizing it only as a mode, Newton deliberately deprives matter 
precisely of that inalienable property without which the structure and 
origin of the world cannot be explained by natural causes.20 
 
Let us assume that this reading is correct and that what Hessen is claiming here is that 
it is Newton‟s acceptance of MIM 4 that led him to introduce God in physics. It 
would then hold that MIM 4 prevented Newton from seeing that nature does not 
need God in order to function properly. But what is, according to Hessen, Newton‟s 
argument for MIM 4‟s necessarily leading to God‟s involvement in physics?    
Hessen begins his account of Newton‟s argument by noting that  
 
Newton‟s appeal to divine reason as the supreme cause, organizer and 
prime moving force of the universe is by no means incidental but is the 
inevitable consequence of his conception of the principles of 
mechanics.21 
      
Significantly, Hessen regards Newton‟s involving God in physics here as a 
consequence of his principles of mechanics, not as a consequence of his ideology. He thus 
provides an internal, not an external, explanation of that involvement. The phrase 
“the principles of mechanics” refers to Newton‟s laws of motion. Hessen will then 
argue that Newton‟s involving God in physics is “the inevitable consequence” of his 
laws of motion. In fact, however, Hessen derives this only from the first law, the law 
of inertia, and in connection with MIM 4. 
Newton‟s first law states that “every body perseveres in its state of being at rest 
or of moving uniformly straight forwards, except insofar as it is compelled to change 
its state by forces impressed.”22 Hessen takes this to be a statement about the nature 
of matter, that is, that matter is characterized by inertia: “Newton‟s first law of motion 
attributed to matter the faculty of maintaining that state in which it exists.”23.But since 
the law speaks of two states of matter that cannot coexist in a body, rest or motion, 
Hessen interprets Newton as saying that “motion is not an immanently inherent 
attribute of a body, but is a mode which matter may or may not possess.”24 Matter can 
be in one of two states, either at rest or in motion.  
If in the beginning matter was in motion, then moving bodies and forces could 
either “alter or stop this motion”25. But if the universe started with matter being at 
rest, only a force that did not follow from a moving body could move it. This modal 
reading of Newton‟s first law of motion necessitates the involvement of God both in 
the creation and in the preservation of nature: “It is clear that such a conception of 
the modality of motion must inevitably lead to the introduction of an external motive 
force, and in Newton this role is performed by God.”26 The argument goes as follows. 
It is undeniable that space presently contains moving matter. Yet, if matter 
could be at rest, there is the possibility that in the beginning of creation all matter was 
distributed in space as motionless matter.27 The problem is how this state of matter 
can acquire motion (which it must, given its presently moving state). The law of inertia 
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dictates that matter would have remained at rest unless a force affected it. Since all 
matter is at rest in the beginning, no force deriving from a body can generate motion. 
Only a divine immaterial force could do this. Moreover, if all matter could become 
motionless via forces deriving from bodies, such as, for example those deriving from 
the collision of bodies,28 it would be possible that at any moment all matter could be at 
rest – and, therefore, as before, by the law of inertia, matter would never again be in 
motion if no divine being were involved. By involving God in both the creation and 
the preservation of matter, Newton excludes the possibility of absolute, universal, 
eternal rest. 
One may object that for Newton a motionless body can start moving if it is 
affected by a force deriving from a body which remains at rest during the affection. There is 
no need for a body to move in order for another body to move: a motionless body 
can cause another body to move without any alteration to its own state of being at 
rest. In this way, one can explain the beginning of motion from a state of rest without 
invoking a deity.  
If this objection held, Hessen‟s claim that MIM 4 leads to Newton‟s involving 
God in physics would be mistaken, because motion could be generated from a state of 
absolute rest by means of natural causes alone (i.e. by bodies and the forces deriving 
from them). Yet, in a letter to Bentley dated 25 February 1692/3 Newton scolds his 
friend for ascribing to him the view that a distant body can affect another body 
without having contact with it: 
 
It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the 
mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and 
affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must be, if gravitation in 
the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it. And this is one 
reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That 
gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one 
body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without 
the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and 
force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an 
absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a 
competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be 
caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but 
whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the 
consideration of my readers.29  
   
It is clear from this passage why Hessen‟s objection cannot hold. Newton 
emphatically tells Bentley that motionless matter (“inanimate brute matter”) cannot 
affect other motionless matter without the mediation of an immaterial being.30 
Epicurus, who ascribes innate (i.e. essential) gravity to matter, is obliged to argue that 
motionless matter “operates upon and affects” other motionless matter without 
contacting it (“without mutual contact”), that “one body may act upon another at a 
distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else.” This, Newton 
exclaims, is “so great an absurdity” that no competent thinker can ever accept it.31 It is 
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evident that the dilemma Newton raises in the last sentence is only rhetorical. For if 
we assume that in the beginning or at a certain moment all matter was at rest, no 
material agent could have caused motion in other motionless matter without having the 
ability to affect it from a distance. But this is exactly what Newton denies. Therefore, 
only an immaterial agent could have caused the gravitation of one motionless body to 
another motionless body. 
Assuming the success of this reply to Hessen‟s objector, our question has thus 
received a first response: Newton failed to see that nature does not need God in order 
to function properly because he believed that motion is only a mode, not an attribute, 
of matter. His physics was modal rather than essentialist mechanics. This forced him 
to find a way out of the possibility of absolute rest and no such way presented itself 
without involving God in physics.   
         
The Collapse of Essentialist Mechanics 
Hessen‟s first specification of the root of Newton‟s failure, i.e. modality, 
would hold only if essentialist mechanics does not result in the same failure. Newton, 
however, denies that essentialist mechanics could explain nature without God‟s 
involvement. If Newton could make a case for this denial, we would be compelled to 
search for a second specification of the ground of his failure to see that nature does 
not need God in order to function properly.  
Immediately before he describes Newton‟s argument from modality, Hessen 
says that Newton aspires to prove “the necessity of a divine power as the organizing, 
moving and directing element of the universe.”32 Yet, the argument from modality 
says nothing about God‟s being the universe‟s principle of organization, but only about 
God‟s being a principle of movement. Therefore, even if modal mechanics were 
successful, Newton would need another argument for the thesis that matter requires 
God for its organization. Moreover, Newton argues that essentialist mechanics cannot 
explain matter‟s organization: bodies affecting one another (causation), either directly 
or through forces deriving from bodies (materialism or immaterialism), and simply 
changing places in space (displacement), even being combined with the mechanical 
laws determining their behaviour, cannot account for the way a body is organized. So, 
even if one did accept essentialist mechanics as an explanation of matter‟s motion, one 
would need another explanation of matter‟s organizational structure. In Newton‟s view, 
such an explanation cannot but resort to the positing of a divine being, an immaterial33 
omnipotent being with intelligence and a will. As Hessen himself observes, Newton 
makes this point in a long letter to Richard Bentley dated 10 December 1692. The 
letter contains several arguments for the thesis that it is necessary to involve God in 
physics. Here I will present three of them. In all cases let us assume that motion is an 
attribute (or essence) of matter and hence that the whole discussion unfolds from the 
perspective of essentialist mechanics.      
I. Newton‟s first argument focuses on “innate gravity”, which is a force that is 
innate or essential to matter. As a force, it is not a body, yet it derives from bodies in 
the sense that its involvement in motion requires one body contacting another body. 
Newton characterizes this force as „blind‟ because it is simply the consequence of 
sheer bodily (or, if you will, „mechanical‟) contact and involves no intelligence or will. 
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He contemplates two possibilities: (a) innate gravity in finite space and (b) innate 
gravity in infinite space.  
First, assume that the universe consists of bodies having essential motion and 
innate gravity and existing in finite space. Such a scenario results in one spherical mass, 
because “the matter on the outside of this space would by its gravity tend towards all 
the matter on the inside, and by consequence fall down into the middle of the whole 
space, and there compose one great spherical mass.”34 More simply, if there were only 
moving bodies gravitating towards one another „blindly‟ in finite space, all bodies 
would collapse into each other, thereby begetting one mass. Thus, in the first scenario, 
all differentiation and organization between bodies would vanish. As Newton puts in 
the General Scholium of the Third Book of the Principia, “no variation of things arises 
from blind metaphysical necessity, which must be the same always and everywhere.”35 
Clearly, this case of essentialist mechanics cannot explain nature‟s differentiation and 
organization.  
Second, assume that the universe consists of bodies that have essential motion 
and innate gravity and exist in infinite space. The result is the formation of an infinite 
number of distinct masses: 
 
But if matter was evenly dispersed throughout an infinite space, it 
would never convene into one mass, but some of it would convene 
into one mass and some into another, so as to make an infinite number 
of great masses, scattered at great distances from one another 
throughout all that infinite space.36 
 
In this scenario differentiation of bodies can be accounted for, but can it explain the 
organization of the universe? In Newton‟s view, the answer must be negative. It 
cannot explain why there is one luminous mass, the sun, and many opaque masses 
around it, the planets. For this organizational structure to have occurred, matter 
should have 
 
divide[d] itself into two sorts, and that part of it, which is fit to 
compose a shining body, should fall down into one mass and make a 
sun, and the rest, which is fit to compose an opaque body, should 
coalesce, not into one great body, like the shining matter, but onto 
many little ones.37 
 
Newton‟s complaint is that essential motion, innate gravity and infinite space cannot 
explain the very specific organization of matter: the fact that luminous matter coalesces 
into one mass and opaque matter coalesces into several masses remains unexplained. 
Why did luminous matter stay together in one body and opaque matter get distributed 
into a multiplicity of bodies? Newton believed that mechanics in general (hence 
essentialist mechanics as well) with all its laws could not give an answer to questions 
of this kind (i.e. questions about fundamental organizational structures). If one 
assumes that in the beginning matter was not a mixture of luminous matter and 
opaque matter but rather (a) only opaque matter or (b) only luminous matter, 
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organization becomes even more difficult to explain. If one assumes that in the 
beginning there were only opaque bodies, why and how only one body was transformed 
into the sun – by means of essential motion, innate gravity and infinite space alone – 
cannot be explained. Conversely, if we assume that in the beginning there were only 
luminous bodies, then essential motion, innate gravity and infinite space alone could 
not explain why and how all those bodies developed into opaque bodies except one of 
them.38 So, nature‟s organization is not “explicable by mere natural causes,”39 that is, 
by the content of mechanics. In order to explain organization, physics must involve an 
immaterial omnipotent being; a being that creates and preserves a certain 
organizational structure through its intelligence and volition.40  
II. Newton‟s second argument41 stresses the difference between planets and 
comets regarding motion. Whilst comets in our planetary system “move all manner of 
ways, going sometimes the same way with the planets, sometimes the contrary way, 
and sometimes in cross ways,” all the planets “move the same way […], without any 
considerable variation.”42 “It is plain” that this difference “could not spring from any 
natural cause alone, but [was] impressed by an intelligent agent.”43 For given that both 
comets and planets (a) are masses of matter and (b) move in the same region of space, 
the fact that the two groups behave, with respect to motion, so radically differently 
cannot be explained by referring only to their mechanical motion and the laws 
determining it.44 And if mechanical motion, which is the only form of material motion 
(including the motion affected by forces deriving from bodies), cannot explain an 
organizational structure of nature, some immaterial cause not deriving from bodies, an 
omnipotent being with intelligence and a will, must be involved in such an 
explanation.  
III. The third argument for the necessity of involving God in physics is based 
on the harmonious complexity of our solar system.45 Newton‟s point is that 
mechanical motion plus the laws of motion simply cannot generate such a complexity, 
so a being with intelligence and a will must have intervened. He first describes this 
complexity. In order for the (primary and secondary) planets to move in the exact way 
in which they do around the sun and other central bodies, their velocity must be 
proportional to their distance from the central bodies. Were they as swift as the 
comets, they would not move in concentric orbits, as they actually do, but in eccentric 
orbits, as comets do. If all planets had exactly the same swiftness, or if the velocity of 
each had been greater or lesser than it really is, or if the distances from the centres 
around which they move had been greater or lesser than they actually are, or if the 
quantity of matter in them had been greater or lesser than it really is, then the 
planetary system would not be what it is but something entirely different. Newton 
insists that all these specific numbers and degrees and quantities and their specific 
connection that makes a harmonious complexity possible cannot derive from 
mechanical motion (i.e. motion caused by bodies affecting one another in space and 
the forces accompanying this affection) and its laws. Since, however, our planetary 
system does exhibit a harmonious complexity, its cause is not mechanical motion or 
matter and the forces deriving from it, which are “blind and fortuitous,” but rather an 
immaterial omnipotent being with intelligence and a will.46 Such a cause would be an 
agent that has the capacity to understand and combine a colossal variety of variables 
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in that singular perfect way that produces a harmoniously complex planetary system.47 
Mechanical motion, even with the assistance of its laws, cannot “compare and adjust” 
all the elements present in a region of space.48 A being with intelligence and a will 
must be posited for this to be accounted for.  
With these three arguments Newton claims to have established the necessity 
of God‟s involvement in physics even if motion is taken to be an attribute of matter 
(essentialist mechanics). For even in this scenario nature‟s organizational structure would 
still require an immaterial omnipotent cause that has intelligence and a will. The three 
arguments have illustrated what is meant here by nature‟s „organization‟, that is to say, 
that bodies acquire a specific position in the system of nature and exhibit a specific 
behaviour and relationality therein. Based on the three arguments we have examined 
as well as some others, Newton claims that essentialist mechanics cannot explain 
nature‟s organization because the specific position, behaviour and systematic 
interrelations of bodies cannot be accounted for by employing solely the conceptual 
tools of mechanics (causation, bodily forces, displacement, mechanical laws). Hessen 
is aware of this Newtonian notion of „organization‟ because he paraphrases Newton as 
saying that “in no case can it be explained by natural causes how the luminous mass – 
the sun – is in the centre of the system and precisely in the position in which it is 
placed.”49 But if the acceptance of essentialist mechanics does not remove God from 
physics, we cannot accept Hessen‟s first response to our question, namely that the 
acceptance of the modality of motion (MIM 4) – modal mechanics – was the reason 
why Newton failed to see that nature does not need God in order to function 
properly. This obliges us to search for a second response from Hessen, for another 
ground of Newton‟s failure.    
 
God and Cartesian Physics 
It has been shown above that both modal and essentialist mechanics 
necessitate God‟s involvement in their respective domains. Since these two kinds of 
mechanics exhaust the determination of mechanical motion, the very nature of 
mechanics requires God‟s presence. Yet, as Hessen notes, for Newton physics (the 
explanation of nature) is solely or predominantly mechanics,50 so for Newton physics 
requires God‟s presence. Our discussion has shown that in Newton‟s case God‟s 
involvement in physics-as-mechanics is not due to his ideology, but rather to physics-
as-mechanics‟ own limitations. Freudenthal and McLaughlin write that for Hessen 
“Newton drew back from fully endorsing the mechanization of the world picture and 
adapted his concept of matter so as to be able to introduce God into the material 
world.”51 This insinuates that Newton could develop physics-as-mechanics in such a 
way that God would play no role in it but he did not do it for ideological reasons, “so as 
to be able to introduce God into the material world.” The previous analysis has shown 
that this is incorrect: Newton did not develop physics-as-mechanics with the aim of 
giving God a role therein, but rather he gave God a role in physics-as-mechanics 
because it could not work without God‟s presence.  
One may object that this conclusion is mistaken, for, as Hessen remarks, 
Cartesian physics, which is also pure mechanics, works fine without involving a divine 
 
 
 
Society and Politics                                                                                       Vol. 13, No.1(25)/April 2019 
75 
force.52 Hessen suggests that Descartes‟s physics was superior to Newton‟s. In his 
words, 
 
the latent materialistic germs of the Principia did not grow to become a 
consistent system of mechanical materialism, like the physics of Descartes, 
but were interwoven with his idealistic and theological views, to which, 
on philosophical questions, even the materialistic elements of 
Newton‟s physics were subordinated.53 
 
The “idealistic and theological views” to which Newtonian physics was subordinated 
are the two beliefs we have already mentioned: the belief in the creation of nature by 
God and the belief in divine intervention to the running of nature. Thus, Hessen 
seems to be saying that in contradistinction to Newtonian physics Cartesian physics 
was free of these beliefs and that this is the reason why the latter is a “consistent 
system of mechanical materialism.” This is confirmed by his statement that “in his 
physics, Descartes does not recognize any supernatural causes.”54  
  Yet, as Hessen‟s text continues, it becomes increasingly difficult to abide by 
this statement. He writes: 
 
It is true that Descartes also considers motion only as a mode of 
matter, but, in contrast to Newton, for him the supreme law is the law 
of conservation of the quantity of motion.55 
 
Since Descartes, like Newton, considers motion only as a mode, not an attribute, of 
matter, he espouses modal mechanics. If he is indeed a follower of modal mechanics, 
Cartesian physics is open to the problematic possibilities we have specified with 
regards to Newtonian mechanics, namely (a) that the beginning of matter could be 
made with universal rest and (b) that there could be a moment when all motion stops 
(and hence when matter exists in a state of universal rest). Hessen emphasizes that 
Descartes reacts differently to this problem than Newton. Instead of involving God in 
physics, like Newton did, he involved the law of conservation of the quantity of motion. The 
law says that “individual material bodies can acquire and lose motion, but the general 
quantity of motion in the universe is constant.”56 Thus, the solution to the problem is 
that the universe as a whole maintains a particular quantity of matter in motion. So 
even if a particular quantity of matter comes to rest, matter as a whole will never 
completely be at rest; some other quantity of matter will be in motion. Moreover, the 
universe does not require a divine force in order to start moving, since a particular 
quantity of matter would have always already been in motion: this is a consequence of 
there being a law of conservation of the quantity of motion. Consequently, as Hessen 
observes, Descartes‟s law of conservation of the quantity of motion makes motion 
“indestructible.”57  
  Yet, what is the ground of this law? How is it established? Descartes could 
respond dogmatically by saying that the law is an axiom, a self-evident or rational fact 
about matter. But, Hessen himself tells us that Descartes does not respond in this way; 
instead Descartes refers to God in order “to prove that the quantity of motion in the 
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universe remains constant.”58 So, while Descartes “refused to admit the conception of 
an external impetus imparted by God to matter,” he justified the existence of constant 
motion in matter by reference to God. His argument, according to Hessen, was that 
“constancy is one of the principal properties of the deity,” so “we cannot assume any 
inconstancy in his [i.e. the deity‟s] creations, since by assuming inconstancy in his 
creations we also assume inconstancy in him [i.e. the deity].”59 This tells us that a 
particular amount of motion is sustained in the whole of matter because, ultimately, (a) 
a change in that amount would mean that God has created an inconstant universe and 
(b) we „cannot‟ assume any inconstancy in God‟s creations because constancy is a 
property of God. This means that for Descartes (according to Hessen) the constancy 
of motion in matter as a whole is sustained ultimately by God because at any time for 
there to be constancy of motion there has to be at any time reference to the law of 
conservation of the quantity of motion, which is grounded in God. It also means, 
though, that for Descartes (according to Hessen) matter is created by God as having a 
particular amount of motion and rest. This holds because if matter had not been 
created in this way, the law of conservation of the quantity of motion would not have 
been grounded by Descartes in the way that it is, namely in God. It is only the assumption 
that matter has been created by God that obliges God to sustain the constancy of motion (and rest) 
within it (in the manner explained above). In this way, God reenters Cartesian physics 
from the backdoor. This is why Hessen, who previously declared that Cartesian 
physics is “a consistent system of mechanical materialism,” now retracts this 
declaration: 
 
[…] Descartes‟s reason for introducing a deity is different from 
Newton‟s, but his conception also requires a deity, since Descartes, 
too, does not maintain an entirely consistent view of the self-
movement of matter.60  
 
Furthermore, if we assume (wrongly) that Descartes was a supporter of 
essentialist instead of modal mechanics, it is evident why Cartesian physics could not be 
“a consistent system of mechanical materialism.” Being a general approach that 
thematizes only mechanical motion, essentialist mechanics‟ horizon of explanation 
cannot overcome the problem of explaining nature‟s fundamental organization. A 
different account of the laws of motion and of the space in which mechanical motion 
occurs (for example, as a plenum instead of as a vacuum) can be provided, but 
whatever the account may be, as long as it only pertains to mechanical motion, it will fail to 
give a fully mechanical explanation of nature precisely because nature‟s organization 
will always be left unexplained. The problem here is not with Newton or Descartes, 
but with the character of the approach, namely that of mechanics.61  
This is the reason why Descartes, pace Grossmann62 and Freudenthal and 
McLaughlin63, does not really espouse a fully materialistic conception of the physical 
world. He is not an idealist only with respect to thought and its laws. He is also an 
idealist with respect to extension and its laws, in the precise sense that an immaterial 
being must ultimately be involved in extension if the latter is to take the shape of 
moving, organized nature. Grossmann is right that Descartes saw the physical word as 
 
 
 
Society and Politics                                                                                       Vol. 13, No.1(25)/April 2019 
77 
a clock whose structure is purely mechanical,64 but he failed to comprehend that 
Descartes also saw the physical world as being in need of a clockmaker, just like and in 
the exact manner that Newton did. For while the clock works without the clockmaker‟s 
help if all its parts are in good condition and have been put together in the right order, 
someone still had to put them together correctly in the first place and must continue 
to keep them in good condition.65  
This understanding of Descartes, that is, as someone who involves God in his 
physics (and not just in his metaphysics), is confirmed by the findings of a scrupulously 
researched article by Daniel Garber.66 Garber concludes that “Descartes is quite 
explicit that it is God who grounds the laws of motion in the world”67 and that 
“Descartes, along with the tradition in Christian thought, holds that God must not 
only create the world, but he must also sustain the world he creates from moment to 
moment.”68 Descartes explicitly justifies the law of conservation of the quantity of 
motion, which is the ground of his laws of motion, by reference to God in the 
Principles, Part II, article 36:  
 
[…] it is most in harmony with reason for us to think that merely from 
the fact that God moved the parts of matter in different ways when he 
first created them, and now conserves the totality of that matter in the 
same way and with the same laws with which he created them earlier, 
he always conserves the same amount of motion in it.69  
 
Bodies, then, do not move by themselves: if God were removed from Descartes‟ 
physics, bodies would stop moving altogether; nay, they would completely disappear. 
“God causes bodies to move in the physical world”70 both by being “the primary 
cause of motion”71 and by “preserv[ing] the same amount of motion or transfer in it 
as he placed in it at the beginning.”72    
 
Second Response: Multiplicity and Inter-Transformation of Forms of Motion 
Since all possible mechanics necessitates God‟s involvement in physics, 
Newton‟s endorsement of modal instead of essentialist mechanics (MIM 4) could not 
have been the reason why he failed to see that nature does not need God in order to 
function properly. Between his discussion of Newton‟s and Descartes‟s modal 
mechanics and the last theme of TSERNP, namely, the correlation between 
unemployment and the increased use of machines, Hessen discusses only one other 
topic: the multiplicity of forms of the motion of matter and their transformation into one another. He 
argues, following Engels,73 that by regarding motion as solely mechanical, that is, 
solely as displacement, Newton fails to comprehend the truth of matter‟s motion, which 
is that it is not only mechanical (displacement), but also thermo-dynamic and electro-
magnetic (at least). Hessen‟s point of attack, therefore, is now MIM 2 rather than 
MIM 4. The affirmation of MIM 2 is now taken to be the reason why Newton failed 
to see that nature does not need God in order to function properly. 
Yet for this to be the explanation of Newton‟s failure, Hessen‟s own belief in 
the multiplicity and inter-transformation of forms of motion should explain nature‟s 
organizational structure.  According to Hessen, Newton‟s inability to consider the latter 
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view is ultimately the reason why he involved God in physics. If it holds (a) that the 
motion of matter has a multiplicity of inter-transformational forms, (b) that this 
multiplicity/transformation accounts for nature‟s organization without God‟s 
involvement, and (c) that Newton involves God in physics because he takes motion to 
have only been mechanical, it certainly follows that the reason why he fails to see 
nature as not needing God in order to function properly is because he thought that 
motion is only mechanical.  
This would accord nicely with the biographical fact that, as Sean Winkler 
acutely observes, Hessen  
 
belonged to the Deborinite (so called after A. M. Deborin) School; a 
Hegelian wing of revisionist, as opposed to orthodox, Marxists that 
was founded upon Lenin‟s initiative to encourage the study of the 
philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel for the sake of developing ever-
improved accounts of materialist dialectics.74  
 
In the 1920s mechanism, according to which motion was only conceived in 
mechanical terms, was a powerful intellectual movement in the Soviet Union. All 
endeavours to present motion as having multiple forms were deemed “idealist” and 
“bourgeois” by the Marxist mechanists. Contrastingly, Hegel saw the logical categories 
involved in mechanics (which occupy the field of the logic of being, found in the first 
part of his Science of Logic) as being “sublated” (i.e., incorporated and thereby 
overcome)75 by the logical categories involved in accounts of self-organization (which 
belong to the logic of the concept, found in the third part of the Logic). More 
concretely, in his Naturphilosophie, the second part of the system, Hegel argues that 
“mechanics,” due to its own limitations, is “sublated” by “organics,” the part 
accounting for nature‟s self-organization.76   
Dialetis provides more details of this historical connection. After Lenin‟s 
death in 1924 Marxism was dominated by “mechanism,” which was characterized by 
anti-Hegelianism and the ambition to reduce all qualities to quantities.77 A. K. 
Timiryazev and L. I. Axelrod were well-known mechanists. The rise of mechanism 
caused a widespread, long-term and sometimes bloody dispute in the Soviet Union 
between the Marxist mechanists and the Marxist “dialecticians.” The latter were 
mainly students of Deborin, who maintained that mechanics could not account for 
nature‟s unity and organization and hence needed to be supplemented with Hegelian 
philosophy, which would unite the “data” offered by mechanics and other sciences 
into an organized whole.78  
Hessen was Deborin‟s most promising student. He tried to show that 
contemporary non-mechanical physical theories, such as thermo-dynamics, electro-
magnetics and the general theory of relativity, confirm the presence of Hegelian 
“dialectics” in nature.79 I understand this to mean that Hessen had the view that these 
theories explain what mechanics cannot: nature‟s (self-)organization.  
TSERNP disappoints us at this juncture. Its discussion of the multiplicity and 
inter-transformation of forms of motion does not contain an argument concerning 
how these forms account for nature‟s organizational structure. Instead of pursuing that 
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argument, Hessen, like Engels before him,80 seems content with establishing that 
mechanics (a) fails to grasp the richness of the motion of matter, because while it is a 
phenomenon with many dimensions, mechanics presents it one-dimensionally, thus 
remaining “within the bounds of one form of motion, that is, mechanical 
displacement;”81 and (b) fails to appreciate the “development and transition from one 
form of motion to another.”82  
Looking at nature, Hessen holds, “we observe an endless variety of forms of 
motion of matter.”83 Contemporary physics has succeeded in explicating “a number of 
different forms of motion (mechanical, thermal, electromagnetic).”84 Thus, for physics 
itself 
 
in addition to [the mechanical] form of motion there are a number of 
other forms of motion of matter, in which mechanical displacement 
recedes to the background by comparison with new specific forms of 
motion.85 
 
Motion is no longer understood as “the simple displacement of bodies in space”86 and 
mechanical motion is no longer considered “the sole and universal aspect of 
motion.”87  
Mechanics not only fails to capture motion‟s richness; it also fails to recognize 
the relations between its forms. Such recognition is attained by “dialectical 
materialism” which “regards the principal task of natural science as the study of the 
forms of motion of matter in their interconnections, interactions and development.”88 
More concretely, Hessen advises that the forms of motion are transformed into one 
another: 
 
In nature, in real matter, absolutely isolated, pure forms of motion do 
not exist. Every real form of motion, including, of course, mechanical 
displacement, is always bound up with the transformation of one form 
of motion into another.89 
 
Contemporary physics, Hessen continues, should “[study] the development of 
inorganic matter in the microcosm and the macrocosm” in order to “[understand] the 
connection between the various forms of motion of inorganic matter and reciprocal 
conversions of one to another” and to “lay a sound basis for a natural classification of 
forms of motion of matter.”90 Based on this classification, natural sciences should be 
classified hierarchically:  
 
Every science analyses a single form of motion or series of forms of 
motion that are interconnected and transformed into one another. The 
classification of sciences is none other than a hierarchy of the forms of 
motion of matter in accordance with their essential order, in other 
words, in accordance with their natural development and the passing of 
one form of motion into another, as they occur in nature.91  
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The consideration of the inter-transformation of the forms of motion forced 
contemporary physicists (Mayer and Helmholtz, most prominently) to “[pose] the 
problem of the conservation and conversion of energy.”92 Naturally, then,  
 
the category of energy as one of the basic categories of physics 
appeared at the time when the problem of the correlations between 
various forms of motion emerged. And as the forms of motion 
investigated by physics became more varied, so the category of energy 
acquired ever more significance.93 
 
Hessen stresses that it was “the discovery of the transformation of forms of motion 
along with the conservation of energy in these conversions” that generated the result 
that 
 
the different isolated forces of physics (heat, electricity, mechanical 
energy), which until then had been seen as comparable to the invariable 
species of biology, were transformed into interconnected forms of 
motion that convert into one another according to definite laws.94  
 
Since all forms of motion are transformed into one another while conserving 
energy, “physics came to the inevitable conclusion that the end result was the eternal 
circulation of moving matter.”95 Matter‟s eternal circulation, its motion‟s 
indestructibility,  
 
consists not only in the fact that matter moves within the limits of one 
form of motion, but also in the fact that matter itself is capable of 
producing from itself all the endless variety of forms of motion in their 
spontaneous transformations into one another, in their self-movement and 
development.96  
     
This is all that Hessen asserts in TSERNP about the multiplicity and inter-
transformation of forms of motion. We notice that he does not address the question of 
how this multiplicity/transformation accounts for nature‟s organization. Although 
Hessen, following dialectical materialism, portrays motion as being richer than 
Newton‟s concept of motion and as developing its forms spontaneously, this does not 
entail God‟s absence in physics. Hessen makes a convincing case against MIM 2 but 
he does not concatenate it to the explanation of nature‟s organization. As long as 
Hessen does not demonstrate how dialectical materialism or non-mechanical physics 
explains nature‟s fundamental organization, Newton will be justified in including God 
in physics.    
   
Conclusion 
This paper aimed to explain why, according to Hessen, Newton failed to see 
that nature does not need God in order to function properly. Hessen‟s first 
explanation was that Newton failed to see this because he took mechanical motion to 
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be a mode instead of an attribute of matter. This explanation was rejected because 
even if Newton took mechanical motion to be an attribute, he would still have to 
involve God in physics, as mechanical motion‟s being an attribute of matter does not 
account for nature‟s organizational structure either. The second explanation was that 
Newton‟s failure is due to his considering mechanical motion as the sole form of 
motion, to wit, his recognizing neither the multiplicity nor the inter-transformation of 
forms of motion. This explanation was also rejected because Hessen does not tell us 
how multiplicity and inter-transformation account for nature‟s fundamental 
organization. Yet, the second explanation need not be rejected altogether; its 
acceptance is conditional upon the provision of a successful description of how 
dialectical materialism or non-mechanical physics explains nature‟s organization. 
TSERNP, for one, provides no such description and hence fails to explain Newton‟s 
failure. 
Assume (wrongly) that Hessen has provided a successful explanation of how 
dialectical materialism or non-mechanical physics accounts for nature‟s organization. 
In this event one could maintain that Newton failed to see that nature does not need 
God in order to function properly because he perceived mechanical motion as 
motion‟s only form. As soon as one makes this claim, the horizon for asking a new 
question is opened: why did Newton regard mechanical motion as motion’s only form? Hessen 
offers an external response: the historical conditions of economic production and 
technological advancement did not provide Newton with the idea of the multiplicity 
of forms of motion and of their inter-transformation. Nevertheless, we should not 
disregard the fact that there is a gap between this external response and Newton‟s 
failure to see that nature does not need God in order to function properly. The 
response does not explain this failure.   
Since no successful internal explanation of Newton‟s failure is given, Hessen 
sometimes resorts to ideology as its external cause. He writes that  
 
the ideological cast of mind of Newton, who was a child of his class, 
explains why the latent materialistic germs of the Principia did not grow 
to become a consistent system of mechanical materialism […], but 
were interwoven with his idealistic and theological views, to which […] 
[they] were subordinated.97 
 
It has been shown above that Newton involved God in physics because of the 
limitations in mechanics‟ explanation of nature; ideology had nothing to do with it. Even 
Hessen himself sometimes agrees with this: 
 
[…] Newton‟s appeal to divine reason as the supreme cause, organizer 
and prime moving force of the universe is by no means incidental but 
is the inevitable consequence of his conception of the principles of 
mechanics.98 
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All Hessen had to do in order to explain Newton‟s failure was to describe how exactly 
dialectical materialism or non-mechanical physics accounts for nature‟s organizational 
structure, but he did not do this. 
My criticism of Hessen is hardly intended to be a sweeping censure of his 
iconic paper. TSERNP retains its legendary status as a monument of externalist 
history and philosophy of science even withstanding my critique. I did, though, aspire 
to analyze a rather overlooked facet of TSERNP in Hessen scholarship, that is, his 
critique of Newton‟s involving God in physics, and to do this in an internalist manner, 
hoping thereby to enrich our appreciation of TSERNP, in particular, and of Hessen‟s 
complex enquiry into the history of physics, in general.99      
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